Private Sector Participation in Water Services: Through the Lens of Stockton by Law Journal, Hastings
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 57 | Issue 6 Article 10
1-2006
Private Sector Participation in Water Services:
Through the Lens of Stockton
Hastings Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hastings Law Journal, Private Sector Participation in Water Services: Through the Lens of Stockton, 57 Hastings L.J. 1323 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol57/iss6/10
Private Sector Participation in Water Services:
Through the Lens of Stockton
Moderator
GARY H. WOLFF, PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES IN
DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT, AND SECURITY
Panelists
WENONAH HAUTER, FOOD AND WATER WATCH
BILL LOYKO, CONCERNED CITIZENS COALITION OF STOCKTON
GEOFFREY SEGAL, REASON PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE
ANDERS STENSTEDT, MORRISON & FOERSTER
WOLFF: Welcome everyone, I'm delighted to see so many people out
on a Saturday. We're each going to take five minutes in the beginning to
briefly introduce ourselves, talk about how we came to be involved with
or knowledgeable about the City of Stockton and maybe some general,
very high-level comments about our individual opinions or attitudes on
this issue. After that, we're just going to have a discussion. I'll take
questions from the audience; I also have a list of questions we prepared
in advance that I'll go to when I think it's appropriate. Would any one of
the speakers like to begin?
SEGAL: Good afternoon. My name is Geoff Segal, with the Reason
Foundation. We are a nonprofit research and education group based in
Los Angeles. We have been in existence for about thirty-seven years. I'm
actually based in Washington D.C. now, but several years ago, during the
Stockton issue, I was in L.A. and made the trek up to Stockton a number
of times. I see many familiar faces, and it is great to be here.
The Reason Foundation is a free market-based think tank. We
research where the private sector participates, how it participates, how to
ensure that the public is safeguarded, and that services are delivered
efficiently and effectively. I'll also note that we really focus only on the
United States. We don't look at international examples. When we look
here in the United States at the role the private sector can play in the
provision of water services, it is certainly a trend more and more cities
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are at least examining and, in many cases, the cities themselves are
deciding to enter into a contractual arrangement for the operations and
maintenance of water or wastewater services. It is something that I will
honestly admit does not necessarily work for every city or every entity.
Our role, if we play one, is to ensure that those cities that do decide
to go forward with or at least examine a contractual arrangement do so
using best practices, making sure that strict performance measures and
guidelines are put into place. I look forward to hearing everyone's
comments and questions, and thank you so much for having me.
HAUTER: I'm Winona Hauter and I'm Executive Director of Food
and Water Watch. We're a new organization that's challenging the
economic and political forces that are promoting industrialized
agriculture and commodifying fresh water and ocean resources. We had
been working most recently with Public Citizen-we're a spin off of
Public Citizen. Public Citizen was working here in California. It had the
"Water for All" campaign, which was working with citizen groups in
fighting water privatization, and the "Water for All" campaign got
involved in water issues.'
We had traditionally worked on energy issues, and had followed the
Enron debacle very closely. When we saw Enron getting involved in
water about five or six years ago, we started getting involved in water.
We have a national and international program, and we work with
citizens' groups all over the U.S. and all over the world who are fighting
water privatization.
Privatization has been a clear and unequivocal disaster in most
places. The big water transnationals, we believe, represent a failed
business model and we have a lot of evidence of that. They say that they
are presenting a new paradigm, but basically what happens is that they
say they're going to be more efficient, but they come in and they under-
bid, and they come back and ask communities for more money. They
aren't transparent, so accountability is very difficult. They are often slow
and don't comply with the monitoring requirements. Their economic
efficiencies are achieved usually through firing about half the staff-
that's a rule of thumb-so then there are all sorts of water quality
problems. Often if you are talking about privatization of drinking water,
it means brown water and boiled water days. They create problems with
billing. Rather than seeing efficiency, we often see that bills aren't
collected and, if bills are collected, they achieve some of the economic
efficiency through cutoffs so that poor people aren't able to continue to
get water from the water company. And we see that the contracting
process-because this often occurs in the form of management
i. For more information on the "Water for All" campaign, see Public Citizen Website,
http://www.citizen.org/california/water (last visited May 5, 2006).
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contracts-is often fraught with corruption. Sometimes it's legalized
bribery through campaign contributions, because generally the water
companies lobby mayors or city councils. We don't think that this is
competition when you get a management contract for twenty or thirty
years. I'll end there, and I look forward to the debate.
LoYKO: My name is Bill Loyko. I guess if I was going to give a bio, all
you have to do is look at the person sitting across from you. I'm a lifelong
Californian, an eight-year resident of Stockton, California, and I spent
the last fifteen years in the financial services industry. I'm presently
regional director for annuity marketing for a financial services firm. I'm
an Eagle Scout, I'm a member of the Executive Board of the Boy Scouts
in the area where I live. I'm a father of five and a grandfather of two. I
campaigned and voted for Richard Nixon twice, and my wife forgives me
for that. When she met me she thought, and still believes, that inside me
there's a Republican. I tell her there's not, but I was not an activist.
Getting involved, I'm like a lot of folks in your hometown: I turn on the
tap, the water comes out. I flush the toilet, the water hopefully goes
down. When it doesn't, I call a plumber. The water bill comes, I pay the
bill. If I don't like the taste, then I might get somebody to deliver water
to me rather than put a filter on my own faucet. So I'm a lot like all of
you and I'm a lot like all of your neighbors. I don't know where the water
goes once it leaves my house and I don't know how it got there. That's
the way I lived my life until we started the privatization conversation in
Stockton.
Being someone who wants to look at both sides of the story, we went
and talked to one of the key personnel who was driving our particular
privatization issue, and we sat down in his office and we said, "How do
we do this and why do we do this?" He had a very long conversation
about why we would want to privatize our water operation. I was
listening to what he said, and everything seemed to be going quite well.
Then he looked at my wife and me, he looked us square in the eye and
said, "Why wouldn't you want to privatize?" He said to me, "You study
it, you look at it, you examine what we're going to do, and then you come
back and tell us why we don't want to do it."
At that point I became a water activist. I read the 9oo-page contract.
I helped orchestrate the campaign to get that contract rescinded. I helped
Dale Stocking, another member of the Concerned Citizens Coalition,
and many others grab I8,ooo signatures so that if faced with this again in
our community, the citizens can vote on whether or not this becomes a
private issue. We've separated out the ability of a politician to decide
who's will run our water operation. It's important that you know and you
learn how your water is being taken care of. Half of the water in
Stockton comes from a private company, but everybody who gets water
from that private company pays more than they do from a municipal
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entity. I get private water and I pay more than my neighbors on the other
side of town who get it delivered from our own city. Most folks don't
know that if they have multiple services. You find that out if you become
an activist or when you at least begin to take action in your community.
We all have a moral obligation to understand what is going on with
our tax dollars. How they are being spent, how they are being utilized,
and how they are being managed efficiently so that we pay the least
amount of money possible. And wherever there is a dollar that can be
saved through a private operation, that can be duplicated at the
municipal level. Every dollar that can be saved in the form of a profit can
be passed on to you in the form of lower rates now and in the future. I'm
involved in water. It's not what I wanted to do with my life, but it is now.
STENSTEDT: Thank you very much. I'm going to stand up here hoping
everybody will keep an open mind because I'm going to have a different
perspective.
Let me tell you how I got involved in water. It will clearly put me on
the wrong side of the spectrum here, because we got involved in water
back in 1999 with Enron. Talk about someone you don't want running
your water system. The issue, whether in Stockton, San Francisco or
Lagos, Nigeria, is governance. We need to know what's going on with
providing our water and the spending our money and we don't either
wasted. I don't want people stealing my money, I don't want it misused,
and I don't want my water company working incorrectly, okay? With
that in mind, my argument is that governance, which is how we organize
our communities, is built on trust. We don't trust Enron today, but at
least we caught some of the bastards when they went wrong. Whether
you're in the private sector or you're in the public sector, we want to
catch the wrongdoers. And there are plenty of wrongdoers on both sides,
so that the issue of governance is very similar whether we're dealing with
private sector operators or public sector operators. Unfortunately, we in
the legal capital of the world, the United States, where we have plenty of
private police to keep track of both government and private sector
investments so that we can try to ferret out the problems and find the
bastards wherever they are. In Nigeria, that's not so easy. In Bolivia, it's
likewise not so easy.
I want to distinguish private sector participation from the notion of
privatization. Privatization, I think, gets a bad name, especially when
we're talking about Enron taking over. Water is not a perfectly
transferable commodity like gold, oil, power, or even telecoms. Water is
really unique and special, like the air we breathe. But unlike the air we
breathe, it's also a business. There has been a lot of talk about this over
the years, because the World Bank and others have recommended
1326 [VOL. 57:1323
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privatization. It didn't work in Cochabamba, it didn't work in Argentina,
it fell apart in Atlanta; it's had a disastrous track record But the fault,
I'm afraid, is not always the private sector player. Look also to the public
sector governance. Who's in charge here? Who's responsible for bringing
water to my kids, my household? Who's responsible for helping the
women in Nigeria get equal treatment in life so they don't spend half of
their time carrying water?
This is a governance issue of ourselves as a community. I respect the
position that we don't want waste, theft, misappropriation, and misuse of
water. But the issue is so similar whether we're dealing with a profiteer
like Enron or a private lawyer like myself. I can't work in this business
unless I make a profit. I am a private sector participant in the water wars
of California, and I love it because it's a mess. It's a great thing for
lawyers, because we can profit from that. Those water wars are
consuming our resources today because our governance system is all
screwed up.
WOLFF: For those who haven't guessed it yet, two of the panelists
are, in theory, in favor of privatization and two are, in theory, against
privatization. I'll leave it to you to figure out who is who. I was chosen as
the moderator because I am neither for nor against. I'm Gary Wolff from
the Pacific Institute in Oakland. I'm an economist and a civil engineer
with a background in water.
Around the end of 2001, I was asked to participate in a paper that
the Pacific Institute was going to write. Peter Gleick, our president, was
at the World Water Forum at the Hague and there was supposed to be a
session on privatization. Hundreds of people were in the room and the
session never happened. It was cancelled, apparently, because of
arguments by the organizers behind the scene about things like who got
to speak first, or whether people could talk about their passion or not. It
was just too explosive an issue. So Peter was standing next to someone
from the Rockefeller Foundation and he convinced them in the course of
standing around that they ought to fund a paper.3
The paper basically says that if you are going to privatize, there are
some principles that should be involved. If water is going to be a
commodity, it should also be recognized as a social good, with certain
public health and social consequences. If you're going to turn it over to
private hands, you should make sure that essential public functions like
environmental flows are taken care of, and so forth. This paper
2. Eliza Bonday, Water Venture is Hard for Some to Swallow, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. II, 2006, at
CI; Monte Reel, Privatization Falling Out of Favor in Latin America, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 2, 2006,
at Ai.
3. PETER H. GLEICK, GARY WOLFF, ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI & RACHEL RAYES, THE NEW ECONOMY




presented what was, at that time, the first balanced approach to this
issue. Astonishingly, and I don't say that with a great deal of pride, it was
the first balanced approach, and we had tens of thousands of downloads
of this full document in the months after it was released. It's the most-
requested document off of our website, and we've been in business for
fifteen years.
Subsequent to that, I was asked to get involved in the Stockton
situation to take a look at what was going on out there. I reviewed some
materials and wrote a letter to the City Council informing them that
while I was neither in favor of or against privatization, there were some
things in their process to think about that they may be getting into
trouble on. One of those things was California Environmental Quality
Act ("CEQA")4 and, indeed, it turned out that they got into trouble over
the CEQA.
About three months later I released an independent technical review
of the proposed water sector privatization in Stockton.' Again, I didn't
take a position. I just pointed out that the operating cost and capital cost
numbers being thrown around had not been thought through carefully
enough. Depending on what assumptions you make about inflation, you
could have large savings from the privatization or you could have no
savings from the privatization. In the capital area, there were some
potential savings, but it was because the low bidder, OMI/Thames,6 was
proposing to use a wetland wastewater treatment facility that the City's
own consultants had said they didn't think would work at a reasonable
cost, and that the other bidders hadn't touched with a ten foot pole-
they didn't want to bid it. But OMI/Thames actually has operating
experience with that technology. They said, "We think we can do it. We
can provide financial guarantees." It's really not a bad offer to a City, to
save $20 million by someone taking a technology risk and providing
financial guarantees for it. That's actually one of the things the private
sector can be good at. So I commented on that in the report.
Finally, there were some risk issues which they weren't really
thinking about very clearly. The City's legal consultants had said, "Oh,
all the risk is being transferred to the contractor. It is all covered. You
are shedding risk." I pointed out that, if you enter into a contract, you
are at contract risk. It's like getting married. If you get married, you are
at risk of divorce. You don't have any risk of divorce if you are
unmarried. But the consultants didn't think that was a good argument. In
4. The California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000--21177 (Deering
2005).
5. GARY H. WOLFF, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED STOCKTON WATER PRIVATIZATION
(2003), available at http://www.pacinst.org/topics/water and-sustainability/water-privatization/
stockton/stockton-privatization review.pdf.
6. A partnership between Operation Management International, Inc. and Thames Water.
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any case, I put it before the City Council, which ultimately voted four-to-
three to award the contract. The citizens, about a month after that, voted
to create a requirement through referendum that all future contracts
would require public approval. The litigation has been going on ever
since. That's kind of the context of the situation. I'm still not for or
against what they did, except of course they should have followed
CEQA, in my opinion. But as to whether they should have awarded the
contract or not, I really have no clear position on that.
Last thing-just last month my new report came out.7 The Joyce
Foundation, 8 a large foundation based in Chicago, was receiving queries
from a lot of people in municipal government in the upper Midwest:
Should they or shouldn't they enter into a privatization? So they
commissioned us to write a piece that was sort of like the New Economy
of Water piece, but with more detail, that explains the fact, how systems
that have improved performance have improved performance, and how
systems that have been failing have been failing. Some of them are
public, some of them are private. We present that information in this
report.
LoYKO: Just one little thing on the Stockton vote. They signed the
contract two weeks before we went to vote because if they had waited
the two weeks we would have had to go to a vote on whether to privatize.
And while they may have argued that saved us money by avoiding an
election, the reality is that they took the vote away from us. Sixty percent
of the folks had said, "We want it. We deserve it." But the council
decided on a four to three vote, two weeks before the election, to sign
and enter into a contract. I think that it is really important to understand
that four people decided our privatization issue. Sixty percent of the
voters said, "We want to vote," but four people said, "No."
WOLFF: That leads to an excellent opening question. I'm going to ask
it of all the panelists, and then maybe turn to the audience. But first, I
want to mention that the words we use can be confusing. I use
"privatization" to mean any time assets and operations that are in public
hands are transferred somewhat into private hands. Whether that is a
private contract, an operation with a private company to operate public
assets, or whether that is a divestiture, a sale of a public asset, to a private
company. I use "privatization" to mean either one. Others use them
differently, so as we talk today we should try to be clear as to whether
we're talking about a sale or purchase of assets between public and
private hands, or about an operational contract where the assets remain
7. GARY WOLFF & ERIC HALLSTEIN, BEYOND PRIVATIZATION: RESTRUCTURING WATER SYSTEMS TO
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE (2OO5), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/beyond-privatization/
BeyondPrivatization.pdf.
8. See generally The Joyce Foundation, http://www.joycefdn.org (last visited May 5, 20o6).
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in public hands. Those are two fairly different structures of legal and
financial arrangement.
STENSTEDT: Do you want to define the Stockton contract?
WOLFF: The Stockton contract is a contract for operations.' All the
assets belong to the public. The rate decisions are made by the City
Council.
LoYKO: Actually that's a contract for the operation, maintenance,
and the initial capital improvements necessary for the wastewater and
utilities. We should be clear that one single contract includes both capital
improvements and the operation and management of our water assets. It
is a contract with what appears to be two complete, different kinds of
things, but it is a contract that includes both in that written document.
WOLFF: Yes, that's absolutely right. Let me just clarify my remark. It
is an operation of publicly-owned assets. The company is hired to
operate existing assets and they are hired to build some new assets and
operate them. But all the assets are still owned by the City in the end.
STENSTEDT: That was the clarification I wanted to note. In the end,
these capital improvements don't belong to OMI/Thames, they belong to
the municipality of Stockton.
HAUTER: We find that people who are in favor of privatization like
wiggle room, and they like to say that management contracts aren't
privatization. We like to speak very simply. If a private company is
making decisions about your water supply, most citizens consider that to
be privatization.
SEGAL: Well, if you look at the fundamental root of where the term
"privatization" started, it came from Eastern Europe and Europe, where
true nationally-owned utilities or services were privatized. They were
divested. British Airways, for example, was once part of the British
Crown, owned by the government. The government no longer has a role,
outside of regulating them as a business. When we talk about water
privatization here in the United States, cities and counties are not
divesting their utilities. They still own the pipes in the ground. The
contract is a 9oo-page document. I actually think it is 8i i, give or take. I
acknowledge anybody who's brave enough to read that, especially
someone not being paid to do it. There are so many remedies and
safeguards written in that contract that I do believe it is unfair to call it a
"transfer" to the private hands. Yes, the private sector will be
participating, but there is plenty of oversight and the City Manager and
the Utility Board still have a role in deciding what projects go forward
9. Service Contract for Wastewater, Water and Stormwater Utilities Capital Improvements and
Asset Management Between the City of Stockton, California and OMUrThames Water Stockton Inc.




and how they are operated.
HAUTER: Can I comment on that? What we find is that the
management contracts are even worse than the regulated utilities. These
9oo-page contracts are written by the private companies, usually
transnational companies, by highly-experienced attorneys. And we have
read some of these contracts as well, such as the one in New Orleans,
where privatization was defeated.'" There is all sorts of wiggle room and
protection for the company. The municipal government is kind of lured
into believing that they're going to get this great benefit and really there
is very little accountability. If the city wants to get out of the contract,
like Atlanta did, it is much more difficult. Rates aren't regulated under
the Public Utilities Commission and there are far fewer protections.
WOLFF: Let's use the Stockton situation as our lens. With respect to
the Stockton contract, what lack of accountability do you see in the
contract? And what inability to get out of the contract do you see, given
that there is a million dollar buyout clause?
HAUTER: Well, there have been rate increases that citizens did not
expect. There have been problems with wastewater.
WOLFF: Where is that lack of accountability in the contract?
HAUTER: If a citizen has a public water utility and they are unhappy
with the rates or with what's going on, they have the ability, through
elections, to deal with the problem. If there is a contract, then there is a
barrier between citizens and the ability to actually do something about
the way their utility is being run.
WOLFF: So it's not the structure of the contract that you're
concerned about. It's the existence of a contract.
HAUTER: Well, there are structural problems with the contract as
well.
LoYKO: On the contract itself, there are components built in there for
guarantees. There is a whole section all about guarantees. There are also
several appendices that detail what OMI/Thames is required to provide.
The contract details those expectations. The downside to the contract,
though, is that on only one issue is there any kind of consequence. I take
that back-there are two issues for not complying with those guarantees.
Now, there are some state-mandated consequences for failure to produce
clean water. That is a state law issue. And they are simply required to
follow state law and federal law on that. So while the contract says that if
you put out brown water, the contract won't do anything, you're going to
have to deal with federal and state issues. But the contract itself details
what OMI/Thames is to provide.
IO. Stephanie Grace, Water Privatization Idea Killed: New Orleans Board Casts 6-5 Vote to Reject
Three Groups Bids, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. I7, 2002, at i.
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The biggest problem we have with the contract is the question of
who's watching it. They're your elected officials. We have a twenty-year
contract and elected officials in office for how long? Four years, maybe?
Of the people who started putting this whole issue together for us, the
mayor that put this together is gone. There are only three members of
the City Council left to vote on it. The only two that approved it have
left. The City Manager, who was the engineer behind it, is gone. The
Assistant City Manager, who was behind it, is gone. The head of the
Municipal Utilities Department, who started out with privatization, is
gone. When you have a contract as sophisticated as what we have in
Stockton, our institutional memory is gone. It's left to people who are
willing to read a 9oo-page document. You're just going to turn on the
water and hope it comes out clear.
SEGAL: Well, the City does have people who are paid to read that
contract and to make sure that the performance by the contractor meets
not only the requirements in the contract but also state and other laws
that guide the operation. In terms of the rate increase issue, the rates did
go up slightly, but this assumes-and I have a report from the new City
Manager, who has laid out the full case-that the rates would not have
gone up otherwise. In fact, historically this rate increase is much lower
than what would have happened had the contract not been entered into,
according to the City Manager and the documents provided by the City
of Stockton.
WOLFF: This raises some great issues. One we are going to come
back to is the rate increase. Another we're going to come back to is the
earlier issue of public power via the referendum process, and whether
that's appropriate or not. Also, we'll address the question of quality of
staff to oversee a contract.
STENSTEDT: My concern is accountability. That's the question. Who is
responsible for delivering water services? The issue here really is
process-do we have an adequate government machine that is capable of
(a) operating a water system (and that's questionable); and (b) managing
a contract? What can a government do?
WOLFF: Three really good issues have come up. One has to do with
overseeing a large contract like this, and how difficult that is with the loss
of institutional memory. The National Academy of Sciences has a book
out on privatization of water services," where they state that when a
government entity goes from operating its services to having a contract
operator, the skills required to manage a contract are quite different than
the skills required to directly manage an operation. They urge any
11. WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD, DIVISION OF LIFE AND EARTH STUDIES,




government going through that transition to be sure to have the right
people on board with the right training to manage the contract. This is a
comment that was made to the City of Stockton very early on.
In the course of researching the Beyond Privatization report, I
discovered that some of the entities that have outsourced in this way for
a contract operation have invested heavily in contract skills. The
strongest example is the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District,
which hired United Water in maybe 1998 to operate and build some
large wastewater facilities. 2 They put together a team of between three
and a half and four full-time-equivalent employees whose only job was to
supervise United Water. But the size of the savings that they estimated in
the United Water contract were about $i million per month, so they
were well able to justify 3.5 fulltime-equivalent employees to pay for
that. They claim, six years later, that they have saved that amount of
money or more. In particular, they have been crowing in the last year or
two because the contract does not allow energy cost pass-throughs. I
talked to someone from United Water who verified that's true.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Until the contractor complains, right?
WOLFF: No, apparently they've attempted to get the sanitation
district to allow energy price pass-throughs and the contract managers,
who are well trained, have said, "No. It's clearly in the contract, you've
signed it, and there's no justification for a change order." So we'll see
how that plays out in the end, if they can force them into bankruptcy or
not. This issue of contract management is an important one. Some places
have done it well, others have done it poorly, and we don't even really
know what other places have done. Are there any other panelists who
want to comment on that-the issue of contract management-with
specific examples?
LoYKO: From a Stockton perspective, because that's all that I can
speak on, the City did not hire and has not hired anyone highly trained in
contract management. We don't have anybody different looking at that
contract than we had prior to that contract. There is a monthly report by
OMI/Thames, and it comes out in the middle of the month. That report
is reviewed, but it is not compared to how that contract is performed. In
contract performance, we do not have someone who understands the
complexities of this contract and we have not had one single report on
the performance of how this company is doing with our facility. Now,
there is a report available, and it's on our website, because we created
one. And the second one will be posted in about a week on how they've
12. For more information regarding the United Water Services Contract, see Milwaukee




done in the second year. 3
HAUTER: I'd like to talk about the Milwaukee example, because one
of the ways we work is that activists call us to tell us what is going on in
the community. One of the things that has happened in Milwaukee is
that the company turned off the pumps to save electricity. They want to
run the pumps at the time of day when it's cheapest. The result has been
millions and millions of gallons of waste spilled into the Wisconsin
waterways. A group of citizens in Milwaukee are beginning to organize
and supervise this contract.
I would also like to give a national perspective by looking at the
Atlanta contract. No discussion on contracts is really complete without
talking about Atlanta, which is supposed to be about the largest
privatization in the country. It was going to be a new paradigm. What
Atlanta found was that things written in the contract just didn't have a
lot of meaning. First of all, the company under-bid. Once again, this is
United Water, which is the affiliate of Suez, one of the top three giant
transnational companies in the world that deal with water. Atlanta
signed this twenty-four-year, $428 million contract. The company was
able to lobby though the conference of mayors to get the deal signed. It's
not like the government performed a deliberate study of the contract and
all of its pros and cons. A lot of this is accomplished instead through our
system of "legalized bribery." So there were a lot of things in the contract
that the City didn't like and was very displeased with. They were
immediately asked to pay an additional $8o million because United had
under-bid. Then United came back and billed the City for $36 million for
work that was supposed to be completed. They paid about $i6 million of
the $36 million, then found out that the work had not even been
completed. The City had to hire its own auditor to audit the contract to
make sure it wasn't being ripped off. Regarding the billing, it found that
money was not even being collected from citizens. There was also a
backlog of work orders. The City was constantly on the watch for the
terms that were not being met.
In January 2003, the mayor finally kicked Suez out of the City, and
now they have the difficult task of trying to recreate their public utility
because they lost all of that expertise.'4
SEGAL: A couple of points. The issue on contract management is an
important one. We need to have the right safeguards and performance
measures. EPA studies show that, where there is private involvement,
the rate of violations go down. When we look at what happens in public
13. Annual Service Contract Review (Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://www.cccos.org/
assets/service contract.doc.
14. For more information on the privatization issues in'Atlanta and other cities, see Water
Activist, http://www.wateractivist.org (last visited May 5, 2o06).
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facilities, things are not as widely reported. I do think we all have the
same common goals: improve quality, reliability and safety. My
organization is only interested in finding the best mechanism to get there.
It is not always going to be private; it is not always going to be public.
There is going to be some overlap.
Five seconds on Atlanta, since it was brought up: it is a great
example of what not to do with a contract. The system and the bid were
fundamentally wrong. My recommendation is that low-bid is not the way
to go. There must be some concept of value, there has to be some
concept of safeguards, and performance must be put ahead of low bids.
As an aside, it is important to note that, although Atlanta did go through
this contract and this cancellation of contract, they have since contracted
out for their wastewater system. They have learned from their failures.
They did not put blackball the initiative or the concept completely. In
fact, they figured out what they did wrong and how they can do it better.
And I am assured that their operations in wastewater are significantly
better and that the City is satisfied with that contract.
WOLFF: I just want to comment that the wastewater operation was
contracted out before the water operation, and there has been no
noticeable argument over that contract, so Geoffrey's point is basically
correct. I just want to correct that fact -it has been there longer.
STENSTEDT: First, I have to comment about accountability. The
system of legalized bribery, just like the incapability of contract
management, is not a failure of the private sector but instead a failure of
our government. If the government, or the municipal utility district, can't
manage a contract, how can they manage the water system? Who is
managing the monitoring, the auditing, the remedying, and the relief? If
we have recourse here, it is to fix the government.
WOLFF: Before I go to the question of rates with Bill, I want to make
a quick point about something Wenonah said. I work in an organization
where facts and knowledge-based decision making are what we advocate
for, but facts and knowledge don't take you all the way. In the end, you
have to make some judgments on your own. But getting the facts right is
important. With respect to Milwaukee and the overflows there, it is
important to know that there have been two independent audits
commissioned by the City of Milwaukee, one of United Waters'
operation and the other one of the Metropolitan Sanitation District, both
of which were headed up by the Chief of Water and Wastewater at
Seattle Public Utilities. Both of these independent audits said that there
was no basis for the claim that United Water had spilled extra sewage
because they were trying to save money on electricity rates.
LoYKO: The argument with respect to privatization is that a private
company can come in and operate the facility with customer savings and
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a reduction in water bills. In this paper Geoff Segal found that
OMI/Thames has no influence or control over rates or water availability,
and that is absolutely true. OMI/Thames does not control rates. Rates
are controlled by our government. 5
Geoffrey also says that OMI/Thames' water cost and performance
are guaranteed, and will result in only a seven percent increase in rates,
and no more. Because of our contract, our City Council has had to add a
consumer price index (CPI) increase to our water and our wastewater
rates. It has been added because of the contract; because the contract
carries with it an automatic CPI increase. So despite the statement that
our rates will not rise more than 7%, we have already seen an 8.i%
increase in our rates in the first two years of the contract. Last year, the
rate increase was 3.7%. Social Security recipients only got a 2.7%
increase. OMI/Thames did not cause the water increase, but privatization
and having a contract caused a rate increase. We have a rate increase
because we have a contract. We didn't have annual CPI increases prior
to having a contract. It is now projected that our rates will increase over
the term of this contract by nearly sixty-three percent.
WOLFF: Other comments on the rates?
SEGAL: Historically, the City of Stockton has adopted large rate
increases on a periodic basis. This method did not recognize the reality
that costs increase on an annual basis and also resulted in large and
unexpected rate increases to the public. In response to this, City staff, not
OMI/Thames staff, recommended changing to a rate structure that
included an annual inflationary adjustment.
There is a detailed response regarding how the rate increases came
about, why the rate increases are there and why, at least in the City's
view, they are not as extensive as they would have been otherwise. With
respect to not issuing the contract, rate increases would have grown at a
much faster rate to cover the capital expenses and everything else.
LoYKo: At the time of the rate increase the Mayor told us at a City
Council meeting that our CPI increase in our water rate is the result of a
contract. It's not because of projects we want to build. We know there
are rate increases that are going to come because of projects we have to
build. It would be silly to think that we don't have that. But I will tell you
that the Mayor who signed the contract said, "We have a rate increase
because we have a contract." That is a cause and effect.
WOLFF: Thank you Bill. I want to go to the audience now for
questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm curious about the possible effects of
15. The Facts About Wastewater, Stormwater, and Water Contract Management in the City of
Stockton, http://www.reason.org/commentaries/segal-stocktonwaterfacts.pdf (last visited May 5, 2oo6).
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privatization on management of watershed level effects. Is there any
reason to think that there is a difference between how public utilities
interact with larger watershed ecosystem services concerns and private
companies handling those responsibilities?
WOLFF: Any comments on Stockton or specific examples elsewhere?
STENSTEDT: That's a regulatory question, and so long as you have the
California water regulatory system in place, whether its Stockton or
anybody else with water rights, they have to comply with the regulatory
systems, so none of that changes.
WOLFF: Others?
LoYKo: The only thing I would say is that, as complex as it is to look
at our little system and our little city, imagine the complexity you would
have if you were to take that out to a huge watershed.
WOLFF: There is a general problem with all water companies, public
and private, in that they make their money from the sale of water, for the
most part, so there is an under-incentive to conserve. This is a severe
problem for public and private companies that a number of people are
working on.
HAUTER: Thames, the parent company managing the contract, has a
very bad track record on environmental issues. In the United Kingdom it
was named one of the top polluters three years in a row in the late
1990S.6 They have straightened some of that up, but they have been cited
for having worse water leakages than when the water was publicly
managed, and for having spills in waterways.
SEGAL: The University of California, Santa Barbara, Bren School for
Environmental Science and Management actually reviewed a couple of
systems and asked that very question. That report, although I don't have
the specifics, outlines some policy guidelines and recommendations on
how to move forward and integrate those guidelines.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In Stockton, were the public employees or the
public utility in any way allowed to bid for continued operation against
the private bidders?
LoYKO: No.
WOLFF: That was my understanding as well. I should editorialize
slightly here. In the Beyond Privatization report, I describe one of the
things that goes wrong so often, a false start. A false start can occur in a
number of ways, but the most common one is the one we saw in
Stockton, where someone at the political level decides that involving a
private company is the solution. Or, the flip side to that is where
someone at the political level decides that the local investor-owned water
16. See PUBLIC CITIZEN CRITICAL MASS ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, CORPORATE PROFILE:
RWE/THAMES WATER (2O02), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/RWE%20Profile.pdf.
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utility is the problem and we need to buy them out. That gets a whole
process underway of buying them out or of privatizing without the
people in the community ever being asked, "What are the services that
you care about? Is the present service quality good, or bad? If it's the
quality that's bad, what do you want changed? If this is bad, how might
we change it? Does that, or could that, involve private participation?"
And walk through it from the ground up. But it doesn't happen. You get
a false start when someone jumps ahead to, "The solution is to change
the form of ownership." That's a false start that occurred in Stockton,
and it is a very big part of what has happened up there.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was an employee of the Public Utilities
Commission Department. It was clearly a political decision to enter into
the contract. The employees were never ever asked whether or not they
could submit a better proposal, which we tried to do. It had nothing to do
with the operation. Stockton, in my estimation, was not in a position to
be privatized because we were a finely run system/utility. That's what
made us ripe for the picking by a multinational. We were never allowed
to participate in the process.
WOLFF: Since I'm editorializing, I should comment-and this is in
support of Mr. Stenstedt's point-that you cannot blame the private
bidders for having structured a bidding situation where the public
operation was not permitted to bid. You cannot blame the private
bidders for having a situation in which a discussion did not take place
with the public about whether bids should even be solicited at all. So
those were the government's failures, and I'm supporting your point.
STENSTEDT: What's missing here is, "What was wrong with Stockton
to begin with?" If there wasn't anything wrong with it, why change it? If
it's not broken, don't fix it. That's clearly the issue. If someone decided
unilaterally that it's broken, it needs a fix, without talking to anyone-
that's a bad idea.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could some of the rate-shock that occurs in
these settings result from the fact that water has not been actually-costed
in the past and that rates have been set politically, so that as soon as you
shift to actual-cost pricing, you're going to have a rate-shock no matter
who's in charge?
HAUTER: This isn't necessarily the case. Pennsylvania is a good
example. Pennsylvania has a lot of privatized water. It's been regulated
by the Public Utilities Commission there. In Pennsylvania, the private
companies charge four-times the amount for water that the public
utilities do, and they've been private for a long, long time. 7 Here in
California, CAL-AM is about thirty-six percent more expensive than the
17. Id. at io.
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public utilities. There are times when rates will go up because of
infrastructure repairs that are needed-that's one of the reasons that a
large coalition has come together to try to promote federal funding to a
trust fund to fix infrastructure.
STENSTEDT: Can I just give a quick example of this issue? In Nigeria
the public municipal agency responsible for water delivery is so broke
that it can't be relied on at all. You don't get water more than maybe one
day a week and it's brown at best. The result is the creation and growth
of an industry of private water purveyors. They sell water in the streets,
driving around with their tanker trucks, and they charge unbelievable
prices. I talked to a taxi driver in Lagos and I asked, "Where do you get
your water for your family?" He says, "It's about sixty percent of my
income to pay for water." It's unbelievable. So this rate issue is huge.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You had indicated that the council voted four to
three, two weeks prior to your referendum, Mr. Loyko? Why did you not
propose your referendum? Under California law, as I understand it, you
have thirty days to overturn an ordinance.
LoYKO: The City Council did vote four to three, and we then went
forward with a referendum. We were 8oo signatures short of overturning
the City Council. In California, if you don't like what your city council
has done, you have thirty days with which to gather enough signatures to
overturn that. And that's a lot of people and a lot of process-to put it in
perspective, the contract is 8ii-pages long. We had to reprint that
contract and attach it to every signature document under California law.
So you're paying to print up, in our particular case, 125 copies of an 8i i-
page document.
WOLFF: Out of curiosity, how many signatures did you need?
LoYKo: I think we needed about i i,ooo and I think we came up with
about 10,200. It's very labor-intensive. We learned a lot about
government, we learned a lot about initiatives, and we learned a whole
lot more about referendums. And we learned a whole lot about
communication amongst your community organization.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Bashing government may be self-satisfying, but
it's not very helpful. It seems to me that comparing public sector actors
with private sector actors is not only a misrepresentation of reality, but
it's a misrepresentation of what the purposes and what the drivers are of
each. When you look at the public sector, the intent is to provide and to
maximize public services. In the private sector, corporations are in it to
make profits for shareholders. There's a fundamental difference, and if
you don't maximize profits for the shareholders, you can be sued for
breach of your fiduciary responsibilities. How this should be dealt with?
That then spills over into questions like, "Do you care about the




WOLFF: This is a good question. I'm going to rephrase it slightly. For
each of the Panel speakers: Do you think that the fundamental difference
between the way government operates and the way corporations operate
is relevant to whether water services should be offered by government or
by private enterprise? And I want to add another twist to that: If you
believe that the public should maintain control of water, under this
argument, then how is water different than food, energy, or any other
essential?
SEGAL: You're right, there is a difference between how public and
private entities operate and how they function. So much of this
conversation has been about ensuring that the safeguards are there
regardless of who operates, and I will admit there are plenty of examples
of successful and brilliantly run public operations, and on the flipside the
same is true of private operations. Incentives do matter. Private
companies have to turn a profit, but their incentives to earn that profit
include providing a good service. They include not being fined by the
regulatory authorities or the City for failing to provide that service. The
only way they can sell a product is to provide a good one. With respect to
the fundamental question of whether water should be different, I look at
achieving outcomes. Let's determine what is the best process to achieve
those outcomes. Our goals here are ensuring clean and safe water and, if
there is a role that the private sector can play, and we can make sure we
can do it safely to where those outcomes are achieved, I think we should
embrace it.
WOLFF: I think that it's a very good question. Any public service, to
be good, requires that citizens be involved to make sure that it's working
well, that their local government is working well. So its a question of
whether we want to strengthen democracy, or whether we want to
continue to move ahead in this process of privatizing everything and
giving over the control of everything to corporations. We can look at
energy. I worked in energy issues for years, and overall in the United
States public power is seventeen percent cheaper than private power.
And I think we could have a very good debate about whether the
transnational control of our food supply is really benefiting people and
how food is being distributed. So maybe we need to have a whole new
discussion about how we distribute basic necessities.
LoYKO: If you have a system that is in trouble and you do not have
the wherewithal to fix it, you may have to resort to bringing in some
private resources to help you do that. But Stockton didn't have a
problem. We didn't have a difficult situation. We had a situation that
worked fine, but we had a political machine that wanted to change how
we were operating. In changing how that was operated, we didn't get to
participate. But there isn't anything being done out at our facility by a
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private provider that cannot be done, and was not being done, by a
public service. We're in the process of, and the City was moving in this
direction, taking our system and moving it into a computerized,
centralized operation and training the operators on how to operate that
system from wherever they are in the plant. That was a City plan. That
plan is still going on. It's the construction of those kinds of things-we're
not in the construction business, we're in the operation and delivery of
service business, and we were doing very well without a private
contractor.
STENSTEDT: There is a dramatic distinction between private
governance and public governance, and this question of profiteering is
certainly central. Yet once we are in a business environment, business
doesn't function without profitability. On the other hand, government
should be independent of that. So eliminating profiteering and greed
from government is equally a problem and a challenge here, and there
are always accusations that contracts such as these are manipulated by
interests that are driven by profiteering and greed. But most importantly,
water is so different. It's not like power, it's not like telecom, it's not like
roads or bridges or these other components of public infrastructure. And
it's not like air, but it's right there with air in that everybody has to have
water. And yet the notion that clean water is not a business, or that it is
somehow delivered to our doorsteps clean and that wastewater is taken
away without a business component-meaning there is an economic
issue here of cost recovery and investment required-is just not sound.
Therefore, the studies on this have distinguished between water as a
commodity and water as a human right, and balancing these two things
to say there is a public-private partnership. Just like Bill said, they're not
in the business of building and construction projects-that's engineering
and construction expertise. Therefore, they outsource. They have private
sector participation to do that stuff. And so our public procurement is
what we rely on for private sector participation to work. If the system
doesn't work, if the public procurement system doesn't work, fix that.
WOLFF: My quick answer is that food is different than water and
energy. Water and energy are natural monopolies. Assets exist that
would be foolish to duplicate, such as pipes or electrical wires. There's a
natural monopoly there. In food we don't have that same situation, so
water and energy are different than food. But in water and energy,
whether it's operated or owned privately and regulated effectively, or
whether it's fully part of a governmental operation where the assets and
operation are all governmental, I think both are models that can work.
But both of them depend upon very effective governance at the top, very
effective management at the top, good democratic processes,
transparency, etc. The problem is, in most parts of the world where there
is a water problem or an energy problem, the government structure is
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very weak, so you really don't have any good solutions available to you.
And that's really what I think we're up against in most cases.
LoYKo: I'd like to say one thing before you all leave. Stockton does
have a contract, but it's because of citizens like all of you sitting in the
audience that that the contract is better. The contract could have been a
lot worse on our citizenry than it has been, because of citizen
involvement in the entire process, forcing ourselves to be in their face
and demanding public hearings, which you have to do if it comes to your
community. It makes for a better contract.
WOLFF: Thank you all.
